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Articles

HEARSAY IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS:
AN AL TERNA TIVE PATH TO RELIABILITY
by Roy D. Brenner
I. INTRODUCTION

T

he federal administrative law judge ("ALl")
considering proffered hearsay evidence
faces a difficult balancing test. Since hearsay can be
both reliable and unreliable, I the ALl must weigh the
inefficiency and confusion of admitting unreliable
hearsay against the unfairness and possibility of
reversal for excluding reliable hearsay. Unfortunately,
no bright-line test for evaluating hearsay reliability
exists. 2 Current standards for reliability have been
criticized as either too vague for fair application or too
cumbersome for efficiency in the administrative
process. 3
Federal ALls need a simple, functional standard
to gauge hearsay reliability. The standard must
provide a reasonably predictable result, as well as
recognize the particular demands of administrative
adjudications.
This article first explores the fundamental rationale for the hearsay rule and its application to current
administrative practice. It then reviews the various
standards now employed to determine admissibility of
hearsay in formal administrative adjudications.
Finally, the article proposes forming a simpler standard by synthesizing the foundational requirements of
the Federal Rules of Evidence residual hearsay exceptions 4 and case law tests of equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.

'Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 689 (1964) ("[T]he reliability of hearsay ranges
from the least to the most reliable.").
2Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980).
3See generally Davis, supra note I.
4FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).

II. BACKGROUND

T

he underlying rationale for the hearsay rule
and the administrative process is relevant to
a discussion of how hearsay evidence might 'be handled best in an administrative setting. The principal
evidentiary dangers of admitting hearsay, while
elementary, provide the primary lenses through which
any theory of admission must be viewed. Since the
goals and practices of administrative procedure are
notably different from those found in ajudicial setting,
an explication of the administrative process, as it
relates to admission of hearsay evidence, supplies the
focal limits of any such theory. Finally, the statutory
and common-law mechanisms for establishing hearsay
reliability add the analytical background from which
an administrative picture of hearsay reliability may
emerge.

A. Hearsay Dangers
Hearsay is commonly defined as an out-of-court
statement offered as evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted by the declarant at the time the statement was made. 5 Admission of hearsay denies the
opposing party the opportunity to test the truthfulness
of the statement by cross-examination. 6
The inability to effectively cross-examine the
declarant leaves unanswered questions as to the
declarant's narration (and sincerity), perception and
memory - the three traditional hearsay dangers. 7 The

5CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also FED. R. EVID.
801(c).
65 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1362 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974).
7MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245. Dean McCormick considers
lack of sincerity a defect in narration while acknowledging that

27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 9
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declarant may have been lying or may have been
misunderstood by the testifying witness (narration).8
The declarant may not have had first-hand knowledge
(perception), or may have forgotten the details of the
underlying event (memory).9
The hearsay rule and its exceptions, viewed
together, represent a balancing between the hearsay
dangers and the search for the truth. 10 While the
general rule prohibits hearsay evidence because its
reliability cannot be tested by cross-examination, the
exceptions recognize that statements made under some
circumstances, as well as certain types of documents,
are probably nonetheless reliable. I I In essence, the
exceptions provide a circumstantial shortcut to reliability, bypassing cross-examination.1 2 This idea is
central when brought into the realm of formal administrative adjudications,13 where the fact that evidence
is hearsay is not determinative. 14 Instead, evidence is
admitted based on "its probative value, reliability and
the fairness of its use." 15

B. Administrative Practice
Despite the apparent similarities, formal administrative adjudications l6 are institutionally distinct from
federal court trials. 17 The rationale for establishing

other commentators consider sincerity and narration as separate
concerns. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note ("Sometimes a fourth is added, sincerity, but in fact
it seems merely to be an aspect of the three already mentioned.").

rules of evidence is altered by these distinctions. 18
The principal difference is that the ALl is the trier of
fact. 19 While the rules of evidence in a jury trial serve
to insulate jurors from unreliable evidence, the rules
"promote fairness" to the parties in an administrative
setting.20 Fairness intersects with reliability, however,
in the decision to admit or exclude hearsay evidence. 21
Formal administrative proceedings are governed
by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").22 The
AP A provides the minimum procedural rules which
agencies must follow. 23 An agency may expand these
rules to suit its specific needs sua sponte,24 but reviewing courts may not impose additional procedural
requirements on the agency Y
The AP A rules of evidence, which are used in the
majority of federal administrative proceedings,26
provide for liberal admission of evidence, including
hearsay.27 Specifically, the APA states:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but the agency as a matter of
policy shall provide for the exclusion of
irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious
evidence. A sanction may not be imposed
AU is always the trier of fact, the policy-making function of
administrative agencies, and the efficiency demands of the
administrative process. Id. But see Michael H. Graham, Ap-

plication of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 353, 353 (1991) (arguing they are equivalent to
federal civil non-jury trials "in all significant respects").
'8Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 5.

8MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245.

19/d.; see also Rose, supra note 10, at 462.

9/d.

20 Rose, supra note 10, at 462.

IOJames L. Rose, Hearsay in Administrative Agency Adjudications, 6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 459, 459 (1992).
li/d.

211d. at 464 ("Reliability is the critical consideration, and the

'2/d.
'3/d. at 460.
'4Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980).
I

sId.

'6As defined by the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.c. §
554 (1994).

threshold issue is whether the proffered evidence is probably
reliable."). But see Davis, supra note I, at 689 ("The guide [for
admission] ought to be the probative effect of the evidence.").
225 U.S.c. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521
( 1994).

23/d. §§ 554, 556 to 557.
24Rose, supra note 10, at 470.
2SVermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978).

17Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in
Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE LJ. 1,4-6 (1971).

26Graham, supra note 17, at 369.

These distinctions include the expertise of the AU and that the

27!d.

27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 10
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or rule or order issued except on
consideration of the whole record or those
parts thereof cited by a party and supported
by and in accordance with reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence. 28
In other words, a proceeding is fair when evidence is
freely admitted, provided that final decisions of the
ALJ are based only on evidence deemed "reliable,
probative and substantial."29 The usefulness of this
standard as applied to proffered hearsay evidence
poses the central problem at hand.

C. Federal Rules of Evidence Residual Hearsay
Exceptions
The Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") are
generally inapplicable to the administrative process. 30
The foundational requirements of two hearsay rule
exceptions, however, can provide part of a useable
standard for evaluating hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings. 3! Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) are
the "catch-all" or "residual" hearsay exceptions. They
are identical, except that in the case of the former, the
availability of the declarant is immaterial, while in the
latter, the declarant must be unavailable. 32
The residual exceptions provide that hearsay,
inadmissible under any other hearsay exception, "but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness,'>33 is admissible under the following
conditions: (l) the evidence relates to a material fact;
(2) the evidence is more probative than other evidence
reasonably available on the same point; and (3)
admission is in the interests of justice and the goals of
the evidence rules. 34 Advance notice to the adverse
party of the proponent's intent to offer the evidence is

also required. 35 These foundational requirements are
consistent with the general view on admission of
hearsay in administrative practice. 36 The rules rely on
case law development with respect to what properly
may be considered "equivalent circumstantial guarantees 0 f trustworthiness. "37

D. Case Law Circumstantial Guarantees of
Trustworthiness
Numerous cases have examined the question of
what may constitute circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. The following review is not exhaustive. A sampling is sufficient for the purposes of this
article, since the focus is on primary hearsay dangers,
as will be explained in Part IV.
In Ohio v. Roberts,38 the United States Supreme
Court established a two-part test to determine whether
hearsay could meet the stringent requirements of the
Confrontation Clause. 39 The dual requirements set
forth by Roberts were the unavailability of the declarant and particularized guarantees oftrustworthiness. 4o
Ten years later in Idaho v. Wright,4! the Court added
that the guarantees of trustworthiness should be shown
from the totality of the circumstances, specifically
"those that surround the making of the statement and
that render the declarant particularly worthy of
belief."42 The Court was divided on whether the use
of corroborating evidence satisfied this requirement.
The majority ruled that corroborating evidence could
not be used to "support a finding that the statement
351d.
36Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980); see also
Nat Stern, The Substantial Evidence Rule in Administrative

Proceedings: Restrictions on the Use of Hearsay Since
Richardson v. Perales, 36 ARK L. REV. 102, 121 (1982).

28 5 U.S.c. § 556(d) (1994).
29/d.
30Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980).
31/d.

32See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) advisory committee's note.
33FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
341d.

37FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note.
38 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
39U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... ").
4°448 U.S. at 66.
41 497 U.S. 805 (\990).
42/d. at 820.

27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 11
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bears 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. "'43
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
. and Justices White and Blackmun, dissented, arguing
the use of corroborating evidence should be permitted. 44 "It is a matter of common sense for most
people that one of the best ways to determine whether
what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is
corroborated by other evidence."45
Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are
not limited to corroborating evidence. Richardson v.
Perales,46 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1971, is generally considered the leading opinion on
determining hearsay reliability in administrative
proceedings.47 Perales involved a Social Security
disability claim dispute in which the claimant challenged, on hearsay grounds, written reports of examining physicians who did not testify and the testimony of
one doctor who had not examined the claimant. The
ALJ upheld the agency's denial of benefits, but was
reversed by the district court. 48 In reversing the Fifth
Circuit, the Supreme Court listed nine factors to
"assure underlying reliability and probative value."49
Principal among those factors were: (1) the apparent
independence and lack of bias on the part of the
doctors; (2) the consistency of the reports; (3) the nonadversarial nature of the social security system; and
(4) that the reports were based on standard and thorough examinations. 50 The Court also noted the administrative burden and expense oflive testimony.51
Additional factors for finding trustworthiness are
recognized by other courts. A commonly cited factor

43/d

at 822.

44/d

(Kennedy, J., dissenting).

at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
46402 U.S. 389 (1971).

4S/d

47Stern, supra note 36, at 105-06.
48Perales v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 288 F. Supp.
313 (W.O. Tex. 1968), ajJ'd sub nom. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d
44 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389 (1971).
49Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,402 (1971).
sOld. at 402-06.
slId.

27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 12

is the lack of contradiction. 52 Facial credibility of the
evidence also can be considered, including whether
documents are signed and sworn or anonymous. 53
Routinely prepared documents are generally found to
be reliable. 54 The apparent credibility of the witness
testifying to the hearsay has been considered. 55
Perhaps even double hearsay may be deemed
reliable. 56

s2Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980)(finding
reliable affidavits entered into evidence without objection);
School Bd. of Broward County v. Department of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 525 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding hearsay
evidence of racial bias reliable where uncontradicted);
Jacobowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555 (Ct. CI. 1970) (finding
hearsay evidence unreliable when objected to and contradicted
by direct evidence).
53Calhoun, 626 F.2d 145 (holding reliable affidavits later
disavowed); Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. I 974)(finding sworn statement
by alien unavailable to testify at deportation hearing reliable,
although declarant later recanted); McKee v. United States, 500
F.2d 525 (Ct. CI. 1974) (rejecting as unreliable a photograph
caption identifying the land in dispute because the identifying
party was unknown).
54 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (finding routine
medical reports reliable); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 832 F.2d 60 I (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding authentication
of routine invoices not required to prove reliability). But see
Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1984)
(ruling that ex parte medical reports were insufficient to
overcome the statutory rebuttable presumption of disability due
to pneumoconiosis from coal mine dust contained in the Black
Lung Act, 30 U.S.c. § 92 I (c)(4) (1994)); Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. Clayton, 578 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding ex parte
medical reports improperly admitted because the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1994), preserves the right to cross-examine witnesses in
disability proceedings).
55Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(finding statements reliable where declarants were disinterested
parties and their statements were consistent); Reil v. United
States, 456 F.2d 777 (Ct. CI. 1972) (dismissing the testimony of
a witness who made mUltiple inconsistent statements).
56Stern, supra note 36, at 114 (suggesting double hearsay can
"constitute substantial evidence if it carries sufficient assurances
of probativeness and reliability").
But see Browne v.
Richardson, 468 F.2d 1003, 1007 (1st Cir. 1972) (concluding
that "none of the individual pieces of evidence are substantial
evidence. Nor can we say that when these meager scraps are
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In summary, the three hearsay dangers, coupled
with the inability to cross-examine, form the basis of
all hearsay objections. 57 But the goals and practices of
the administrative process militate against excluding
hearsay evidence if it is deemed reliable. 58 Even in
judicial proceedings, the residual exceptions allow a
more general admission of hearsay. 59 Finally, case law
does provide reasonable examples of circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness to guide an ALl's
evaluation of hearsay evidence. 6o
III. CURRENT MODELS AND STANDARDS

A

s a practical matter, only two basic standards exist for the admission of hearsay in
administrative adjudications: the AP A and the FRE.
Each has its adherents and detractors. In addition, the
United States Department of Labor has adopted a
modified version of the FRE, which some argue
should be applied across the federal administrative
board. 61 Finally, Professor Davis advocates admitting
all hearsay, regardless of its perceived value. 62
A. The AP A Standard

The AP A standard has two parts and, consequently, two distinct lines of problems. The first part
applies to admissibility of evidence, while the second
part limits the evidence that may be relied upon by the
ALl in making a ruling or order.
Under the first part, hearsay is admissible provided it is relevant, material and not unduly repetitious. 63 While these terms are generally understood,

gathered together the total pile may be called substantial").

57See supra text accompanying notes 5-15.
58See supra text accompanying notes 16-29.
59See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
60See supra text accompanying notes 38-60.
6lGraham, supra note 17, at 383-84; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of
the Federal Rules ofEvidence in Federal Agency Adjudications,
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,25 (1987).
62Davis, supra note 1.
63 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994).

the relatively free standard of admissibility has been
criticized as too permissive. 64 Moreover, remand is
more likely for an ALl's failure to admit evidence,
than for a failure to exclude particular testimony or
documents. 65 The likelihood of remand can pressure
an ALl to admit evidence of little probative value,
creating delay and an unduly inflated record. 66
Once admitted, hearsay evidence alone can be
dispositive provided it is reliable, probative, and
substantia1. 67 While these terms are somewhat vague,
the concept of reliability is distinct from probative
value. 68 Probative value relates to relevancy, while
reliability relates to veracity.69 The terms, however,
are sometimes used interchangeably.70
Embracing both reliability and probative value is
substantial evidence. It has been defined as "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."71 A substantial
evidence standard is "less demanding than that of
preponderance of the evidence, and the ALl's decision
need not constitute the sole inference that can be
drawn from the facts.'>72
64See Graham, supra note 17, at 369-70; Rose, supra note 10, at
476-77.
65Graham, supra note 17, at 369-70 ("Generally there is no cause
for remand for allowing evidence to be admitted in error.");
Pierce, supra note 61, at 6-7 ("[I]t seems impossible for an
agency action to be reversed on the basis that the agency
erroneously admitted evidence.").
66Graham, supra note 17, at 369-70.
67 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994).
68Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,407-08 (1971) (referring
to "administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability
and probative value"); see also Rose, supra note 10, at 468.
69Rose, supra note 10, at 478; cf FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory
committee's note ("Problems of relevancy call for an answer to
the question whether an item of evidence ... possesses sufficient
probative value .... ").

7°See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA
L. REV. 331, 342 (1961) (discussing "a tendency to admit
hearsay where there can be no serious doubt of the credibility of
the extra-judicial declarant - i.e., where probative force is
high").
71Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938).
72Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 977 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1992).

27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 13
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Hearsay alone may constitute substantial evidence, although this was not always the case. 73 In
Consolidated Edison v. NLRB,74 the United States
Supreme Court stated: "Mere uncorroborated hearsay
or rumor does not constitute substantial evi·dence. "75
Some thirty years later, the Court in Richardson v.
Perales76 clarified that statement by saying that a
"blanket rejection by the Court of administrative
reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and
probative value," was not the intended legacy of
Consolidated Edison. 77
The Perales Court also put to rest the "legal
residuum" rule regarding reliance on hearsay in administrative proceedings. 78 The rule, first stated in
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice CO.,19 allowed for
admission of hearsay but provided "there must be a
residuum of legal [non-hearsay] evidence to support
the claim before an award can be made."80 Prior to the
Perales rejection, the rule had been widely condemned
as an illogical restriction on hearsay evidence. 81
B. Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) were
adopted in 1975 for use by federal courts to "secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined. "82 The FRE provide for the exclusion of

hearsay, subject to a number of exceptions. 83
Ofthe 280 sets of regulations governing admissibility of evidence in federal administrative adjudications, only thirty-seven mention the FRE.84 Where
statutes or agency regulations make reference to the
FRE standard, the standard is to be employed only "so
far as practicable. "85 The vagueness of this qualification on the FRE standard creates a great deal of
uncertainty at the agency level and leaves reviewing
courts with inconsistent application and direction. 86
Opponents to the use of the FRE hearsay rules in
administrative proceedings have cited the lack of a
jury as negating the necessity for protective evidentiary rules. 87 In fact, the Administrative Conference of
the United States 88 recommended against adopting the
FRE to administrative practice, principally because of
the hearsay rules. 89
On the other hand, proponents of the FRE
hearsay rules have argued that formal adjudications
are quite similar to federal civil non-jury trials. 90
Indeed, the Supreme Court found that an ALJ
performs a role "functionally comparable" to a trial
judge. 91 Nevertheless, the FRE still present problems
of complexity and provide only a limited ability to

8JFED. R. EVID. 802 to 805.
84Pierce, supra note 61, at 5. But see Rose, supra note 10, at 461
(estimating some 200 informal procedures within the federal
system).
85Graham, supra note 17, at 372.

86/d. at 383; Pierce, supra note 61, at 7.

73Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.
74 305 U.S. 197 (1938).

751d. at 230.
76 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
77/d. at 407-08.
78Stern, supra note 36, at 112. Professor Stern notes, however,
that some courts continue to rely on the rule's underlying
premise. Id. at 114-15.
79 113 N.E. 507 (N.Y. 1916).

87Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 5; Graham, supra note 17, at 360;
Stern, supra note 36, at 103 ("Many, ifnot most, rules limiting
the admission of evidence are designed not so much to aid the
search for truth as to prevent consideration of certain types of
relevant evidence by those thought incapable of assigning such
evidence its proper weight.").
885 U.S.C. §§ 593-596 (1994). Funding for the Conference was
terminated by a House-Senate committee on September 13,
1995. See William Funk, R.I.P. A.C. u.s., ADMIN. & REG. LAW
NEWS, Winter 1996, at 1, 11.

8°/d. at 509.

89Graham, supra note 17, at 359. The Conference's 1986
recommendation is codified at I C.F.R. § 305.86-2 (1995). For
a discussion of the recommendation, see Pierce, supra note 61.

81 Stern, supra note 36, at 113.

90/d. at 360. But see supra note 21.

82FED. R. EVID. 102.

91Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,513 (1978).

27.1 U. Bait. L. F. 14
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distinguish between reliable and unreliable hearsay.92
C. The Department of Labor Modifications

Rejecting the FRE "so far as practicable"
scheme, as well as the AP A evidence rules, the United
States Department of Labor ("DOL") developed its
own set of evidence rules for formal hearings. 93 The
DOL adopted the FRE hearsay rules while adding
exceptions relating to documents and written reports
of experts to accommodate application in the administrative arena. 94
The DOL standard's permissive use of the FRE
avoids the problems reviewing courts have with the
"so far as practicable" application ofthe FRE.95 At the
same time, an ALJ has the support of the FRE to
expedite the administrative proceeding.96 The FRE are
widely known and have a substantial body of case law
interpretation, making rules predicated on the FRE
familiar to the litigants. 97

D. Another View: Admit All
Standing alone in many respects, Professor
Kenneth C. Davis has long maintained the position
that there should be no distinction drawn between
hearsay and nonhearsay.98 Whether evidence is
admitted or excluded, and the weight it is accorded,
should be determined by its probative value. 99 "[T]he
guide should be a judgment about the reliability of
particular evidence in a particular record in particular
circumstances, not the technical hearsay rule with all

nFED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note.
9JGraham, supra note 17, at 373. The rules are codified at 29
C.F.R. §§ 18.101 to 18.1104 (1995).
941d. at 376-82.
9lPierce, supra note 61, at 25. Reviewing courts have interpreted
"so far as practicable" inconsistently. Id. at 16; Graham, supra
note 17, at 383.
96Pierce, supra note 61, at 25.
971d.
98Davis, supra note 1, at 689.
99/d.

its complex exceptions."loo Professor Davis argues for
the application of a reasonable person standard to
determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a
finding. lol This judgment, however, must take into
consideration the record and the type of proceeding. 102
Davis' approach is criticized on the bases of
fairness and predictability. "Any free-wheeling, open
admission of all proffered evidence 'for whatever it is
worth,' regardless of reliability, is neither fair nor
predictable. "103

E. Summary
Despite these apparent conflicts, the admission of
reliable evidence and the exclusion of unreliable
evidence remain the common goals. 104 Implicit in
each of the foregoing standards is the tension between
an efficient administrative process and fairness to the
parties involved. 105 While the AP A standard provides
the parties with a broad opportunity to support their
cases, it does so at the risk of an inflated and unwieldy
record. 106 The FRE promote fairness with a more
predictable, albeit complex, set of rules, but in the
process, the FRE's standards may exclude some
reliable evidence.107 The DOL modifications ease
some of those restrictions, but the complexity largely
remains. 108 Professor Davis' thesis provides for
simplicity, but simplicity comes at the expense of
predictability. 109

,oold.
IO'/d. at 695 ("A finding may be supported by the kind of
evidence on which reasonable people are accustomed to rely in
serious affairs, whether or not the evidence would be admissible
before a jury.").
I021d. at 698.

IOJRose, supra note 10, at 478.
I04Rose, supra note 10, at 479 ("There is no real dispute that
unreliable evidence ought to be excluded.").
lOSe! Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 5-6.
106See supra text accompanying notes 63-81.
I07See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
108See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
I09See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

P

erhaps the principal dispute underlying the
hearsay issue is not how to judge reliability,
but when. The AP A and Professor Davis favor
admission followed by a reliability determination.
The FRE standard requires a demonstration of probable reliability before admission. Each view is supported by substantial reasoning. It is possible to
satisfy the requirements of each view through a
synthesis of the foundational elements of the residual
hearsay exceptions and the case law tests of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The result is a
two-part test designed to minimize the hearsay dangers
and to satisfy the AP A requirements while remaining
relatively simple to apply.
This synthesis begins with the residual hearsay
exceptions. 11O The rules allow hearsay to be admitted
as substantive evidence provided: (1) it relates to a
material fact; (2) it is more probative than other
evidence reasonably available on the same point; and
(3) admission of the evidence is in the interest of
justice. I II The evidence must also embody circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to an
identified hearsay exception. I 12
The first part of the test is drawn from the
elements of the residual exception: Hearsay is admissible when it has probative value concerning a material fact and is not obviously unreliable.
To determine that hearsay evidence is not obviously unreliable, two requirements should be satisfied.
First, the evidence cannot be "so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable
factfinder would not credit it. "113 This requirement

mirrors the clearly erroneous standard of review. I 14
Second, the source of the evidence must be known.
This requirement excludes mere rumor and documents
of an unknown author or origin. 115 Support for this
construction can be found in Irving Younger's proposal to allow admission of hearsay provided the
evidence reasonably could be accepted as trustworthy
by the trier of fact as an initial question. I 16
Thus, the first prong of the test satisfies relevancy requirements fundamental to the AP A and FRE
standards. 117 This preliminary test also quickly disposes of clearly unreliable evidence. The second part
of the test is drawn from the case law determinations
of trustworthiness. While hearsay constitutes reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence when it meets the
requirements for admissibility in the test's first part,
the second part of the test guarantees the trustworthiness of the evidence in light ofthe three hearsay
dangers, as explained below.
Drawing from case law, the indicia of trustworthiness are many. liS They include apparent independence of the declarant, lack of contradiction by direct
evidence, lack of objection to admission, corroboration, and standard or routine practices or documents. I 19
Creating a list for an ALl's reference merely mimics
the often confusing FRE hearsay exceptions. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that such a list could be
sufficiently comprehensive.
Instead, an ALl should look directly to the three
hearsay dangers - narration, perception, and memory
- and view the evidence within the context of each
States, 456 F.2d 777 (Ct. CI. 1972) (rejecting testimony
involving multiple inconsistent statements).
114Jd.
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supra text accompanying notes 30-37.

II lId.

"2/d. The residual exception also requires advance notice. But
this aspect of the rule is inapposite to the efficiency of the
administrative process and is not a part of this proposal.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985);
United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1992)
("We must accept the evidence unless it is contrary to the laws of
nature ... or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no
reasonable factfinder could accept it."); see also Reil v. United
113
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liS Anderson v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (Ct. Int'I
Trade 1992) (noting with approval AU's rejection of testimony
referring to unnamed declarants); McKee v. United States, 500
F.2d 525, 528 (Ct. CI. 1974) (excluding identifying photo caption where caption's writer was unknown).

"6Irving Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32
S.C. L. REV. 281, 293 (1980).
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5 U.S.c. § 556(d)(1994); FED. R. EVID. 402.

118See

119Jd.

supra text accompanying notes 38-60.
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one. Is there a reason to believe the declarant was
testimony of Perales' personal physician. 122 The
insincere or misunderstood? Did the declarant have
evidence, therefore, would be admissible after the first
first-hand knowledge? Do circumstances suggest the
prong of the test.
declarant's memory would weigh against the truthfulApplying the test's second prong, the ALl would
look
to the nature of the reports for indicia of
ness of the evidence? In asking these questions, the
ALl applies the same criteria justifying any recogtrustworthiness in light of the three hearsay dangers.
The ALl would find: (1) that narration posed no
nized hearsay objection. Accordingly, the ALl should
problem since the evidence consisted of written
be able to determine whether the evidence bears
medical reports; (2) perception posed no problem as
sufficient reliability to use fairly in reaching a
the doctors writing the reports had examined
decision.
Perales; 123 and (3) since no evidence suggested the
The second prong of the test minimizes the
hearsay dangers by requiring a demonstration of reports were written long after the examination,
memory posed no problem. By allaying the three
reliability equivalent to the basis for a hearsay excephearsay dangers, the evidence would be deemed
tion. It also satisfies the AP A requirements for
reliable, probative, and substantial. Therefore, the
substantive evidence in accord with the Perales
opinion. 12O Finally, a circumstantial guarantee of evidence would satisfy the second prong of the test.
Since both parts of the test were satisfied, the evidence
trustworthiness satisfies the FRE residual hearsay
could be used to support the ALl's decision, as was
exception requirement.
held by the Perales Court.
Viewed as a whole, the test provides a relatively
A similar result occurred in Woolsey v. NTSB.124
.simple application an ALl could employ to minimize
In that case, Woolsey objected to several documentary
the dangers of relying on hearsay, while satisfying due
exhibits proffered by the government to prove that
process and the AP A requirements. Since the test
Woolsey's company was holding itself out to the
satisfies the FRE residual exception in all but the
public. 125 The evidence included published magazine
advance notice aspect, the test could be used by
ads, promotional materials, several facsimile transmisagencies required to follow the FRE either "so far as
sions from persons known to the FAA investigator,
practicable" or with a change in agency rules to
and
several bank checks from customers. 126
eliminate the advance notice requirement.
Applying the two-prong test proposed by this
This test should yield results consistent with
article, the Woolsey evidence would have been admiscurrent case law. For example, in Perales the hearsay
sible. First, all of the evidence was probative of
evidence consisted of· medical reports from four
material facts. Second, none of the evidence was
examining doctors and the direct testimony of a fifth
improbable. Third, all of the items came from identidoctor whose testimony was based on other doctors'
written reports - not a direct examination of fied sources. Thus, under the first part of the test, all
the evidence would be admissible. Next, the evidence
Perales. 121 Applying this test's first prong, an ALl
would find medical opinions regarding a claimant's
physical condition probative of a material fact. Next,
'22Id. at 402.
the ALl would determine that reports were from
12JThe fifth doctor did not examine Perales, but was subject to
known sources and did not present evidence which . cross-examination.
was impossible to believe or internally inconsistent 124993 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming emergency revocation
even though they were in conflict with the direct
of a commercial pilot certificate), cert. denied, I 14 S. Ct. 1829
(1994).

'2°Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).

121Id.

'25Id. at 519. Woolsey's license was revoked for operating as a
common carrier while following the less stringent safety rules
applicable to private aircraft. Id. at 517.
'26Id. at 519.
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would be deemed trustworthy because none of the
materials present serious concerns of narration,
memory, or perception. 127 Consequently, the evidence
propounded in Woolsey would constitute substantial
evidence, as was found by the Fifth Circuit.

V. CONCLUSION

F

ederal ALJ s need a simple, uniform standard
to weigh hearsay evidence. This standard
must comply with the specific requirements of the
AP A. It must minimize hearsay dangers while promoting the efficiency goals of the administrative process. It must be fair.
To construct such a standard, the foundational
requirements of the FRE residual exceptions can be
meshed with the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, as developed in recent case law. The
result is a two-prong test capable of meeting the AP A
and due process requirements while maintaining a
high level of admissibility of hearsay evidence.
Utilizing this test, the ALJ would first exclude
evidence that is either irrelevant, immaterial or facially
unreliable. If admissible, the ALJ would analyze the
evidence with regard to the three hearsay dangers. If
the evidence poses no significant hearsay concerns, it
could be admitted and relied upon as substantial
evidence.
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I27While a "fax" may be garbled in transmission, Woolsey did not
object to the accuracy of the documents, only to their hearsay
nature. Id.
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